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SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
CABINETS AND POLICY-MAKING:
Types of Policy, Features of Cabinets, and 
Their Consequences for Policy Outputs 1
A n t o n io  La  Spin a
The comparative analysis of governments, which has been the 
object of a growing attention over the last decade, has begun by 
concentrating on the "organizational" features of cabinets 2 More recently 
the focus of interest appears to have shifted from the description of the 
structure of cabinets to the explanation of their functioning. More 
precisely, the organizational characteristics are still carefully considered, 
but maybe with a new aim in view. Decision-making by cabinets becomes 
the explanandum, and the effects that structural features have on it should 
now be part of the explanans 3-
This view of cabinets brings with it some fascinating problems: 
what is the impact, if any, o f  cabinets on national policy-making? and, 
conversely, what is the impact on cabinets of the factors that we single out 
as independent-explanatory variables? what theoretical framework should 
we use in dealing with these problems?
Bearing such questions in mind, without claiming to offer a 
satisfactory answer here, the strategy I would like to follow in this paper 
is to begin with a taxonomy of the policies that can be treated by a 
cabinet. To this I will add some of the characteristics of the cabinet itself
* A first draft of this paper has been discussed in the seminar on Comparative 
Government held by Jean Blondel at the European University Institute, during my stay as 
a Jean Monnet fellow. The text has been improved thanks to some suggestions by Jean 
Blondel himself, Giandomenico Majone, and the linguistic assistance provided by 
Jennifer Greenleaves. The responsibility for the positions expressed and for possible 
obscurities and weaknesses is of course entirely mine
2 See for example E. Spagna Musso (ed.), Costituzione e struttura del Governo. Vol. II: 
L' organizzazione del Governo negli stati di democrazia parlamentare, Padova, Cedam, 
1982; J. Blondel, The Organization o f Governments, London, Sage, 1982; Id. and F. 
Muller-Rommel (eds.), Western European Cabinets, London, Macmillan, 1988.
3 See the special Issue of the "European Journal of Political Research" (XVI, 1988), 
edited by J. Blondel and J.L. Thiebault, on Cabinet Structure and Decision Making 
Processes in Western Europe-, J. Nousiainen, Substance and Style o f Cabinet Decision- 
Making, EUI working paper no. 359, 1988; J. Blondel, Decisioni di governo e vincoli 




























































































and of its proximate environments, in order to derive hypotheses about 
which policies could foreseeably be adopted by which cabinet.
Trying to establish a link between the study of cabinets and the 
analysis of policy outputs can be useful at least for two reasons. First, 
policy outputs are the most obvious, the most easily observable, and one 
of the most important results of the cabinet's operation. They should be 
taken into account, therefore, if one wishes to test hypotheses about the 
functioning of a cabinet and how it is affected by structural constraints. 
The study of policy outputs, then, can be instrumental for such an 
explanatory purpose. Second, policy outputs and their explanantia are 
relevant in themselves, for instance when in a given country reform of 
the cabinet is being discussed. Indeed, one of the arguments in favour of 
the reform could be that the present features of the cabinet are deemed 
inadequate, or not sufficiently adequate, to favour desired policies (e. g. 
legislation or administrative measures which respond quickly and 
effectively to serious and complex social problems), while the alternative 
features proposed are deemed suitable, or better suited than the existing 
ones, to obtain those desired policies.
Wilson's Typology o f Public Policies
It is possible to distinguish between public policies according to 
very different criteria: field, scope, ideological colouring, implementing 
agency, and so on. The idea that has inspired the typologies advanced by 
some political scientists, such as Lowi, Salisbury and Wilson, is that 
public policies must be classified according to the conditions in which 
they are adopted or transformed during the process of adoption. In other 
words, to each type of policy should correspond, in ideal conditions, a 
distinctive type of policy-making process 4. After Lowi's seminal but 
analytically unsatisfactory articles, a lively debate has occurred among 
proponents of various taxonomies 5. Here I cannot dwell on the details of
4 The seminal works on this respect are some well known articles by Theodore Lowi: 
American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, "World Politics", 
XVI, 1964, pp. 677-715; Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Towards an Antidote fo r  
Technocracy, "Public Administration Review", XXX, 1970, pp. 314-325; Four Systems 
o f Policy, Politics, and Choice, PAR, XXXII, 1972, pp. 298-310.
^ See R.H. Salisbury, The Analysis o f Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles, 
in A. Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, Chicago, Markham, 1968, pp. 
151-175; Id. and J. Heinz, A Theory o f Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary 
Applications, in I. Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science, Chicago, 
Markham, pp. 39-60; S. Gustavsson, Types o f Policy and Types o f Politics, 




























































































this debate, nor on the peculiarities of each position. I will refer only to 
James Wilson's typology, which is, in my view, the most convincing 
among the ones proposed so far6.
Wilson classifies a public policy according to the degree of 
diffusion or concentration of the costs and benefits which this policy 
allocates to its addressees. Given different combinations of concentration 
and diffusion of costs and benefits, the implicit (Downsian) assumption is 
that politicians usually tend to choose those policies that maximize the 
likelihood of their staying in office (so, for example, policies that are 
supposed to lead to electoral gains for them or for their party; or policies 
that do not threaten the stability of the govemamental coalition, 
endangering ministerial posts thereby), and they avoid policies that imply 
loss of support, and therefore diminishing that likelihood. Wilson 
identifies four types of policy and of policy-making process.
a) Policies with concentrated benefits and diffused costs. Such 
policies will tend to be adopted rather easily, because the potential 
opponents are, in ideal conditions, a vast and disorganized group of 
persons (e.g. the taxpayers) not well aware of losing something on that 
particular issue; conversely, the beneficiaries are few, tend to be easily 
identifiable, and know that they are getting the benefit. They are 
expected, therefore, to repay the decision-makers with their gratitude. In 
order to use a shorter name, I will borrow a term from Lowi and call 
these policies distributive.
b) Policies with concentrated benefits and concentrated costs. Here 
both costs and benefits fall on small groups, or on categories which are 
rather numerous, but are already organized (for instance by a trade 
union). Again, the potential winners know that they are gaining something 
and are expected to be grateful towards the decision-maker. But now the 
potential losers, too, know that they could be losing and (if they are not 
already organized) being few have an incentive to overcome the free­
(Really) Determine Politics? and Eventually How?, "Policy Studies Journal" (special 
issue), V, 1977, 554-570; P. Steinberger, Typologies o f Public Policy: Meaning 
Construction and the Policy Process, "Social Science Quarterly", LXI, 1980, pp. 185- 
197; G.D. Greeenberg et al., Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from  
Empirical Research, "Am. Pol. Sc. Rev.”, LXXI, 1977, pp. 1532-1543; R.J. Spitzer, 
Promoting Policy Theory: Revising the Arenas o f Power, PSJ, XV, 1987, pp. 675-689; 
A. Kellow, Promoting Elegance in Policy Theory: Simplifying Lowi's Arenas o f Power, 
PSJ, XVI, 1988, pp. 713-724; T.J. Lowi, An Assessment o f Kellow's "Promoting 
Elegance in Policy Theory", PSJ, XVI, 1988, pp. 725-728. For a discussion of Lowi’s 
typology see also A. La Spina, La decisione legislativa, Milano, Giuffre', 1989, pp. 279
6 J.Q. Wilson has proposed his own typology of public policies in his book on Political 
Organizations, New York, Basic Books, 1973, pp. 332 ff., and in The Politics o f 
Regulation, in J.W. McKie (ed.), Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament, 
Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1974, pp. 135-168. A more refined 
version is to be found in The Politics o f Regulation, in J.Q. Wilson (ed.), The Politics of 




























































































rider problem. So they will organize themselves in order to react and 
block the undesired policy. It is understandable, then, that such policies 
imply strong conflict and painful decisions. If there are no particular 
reasons for pressing these policies (such as the imperative need to adhere 
to the party program, or exceptional advantages gained from favouring 
the potential beneficiaries), it will be better to avoid making enemies. 
This kind of policy, then, could be postponed sine die (non-decision); or 
could be delegated to agencies with no political responsibility; or could be 
transformed so to accomodate the claims of the opponents. I will call such 
policies divisive 7.
c) Policies with diffused benefits and concentrated costs. In the 
ideal case we have now many beneficiaries, but they belong to a 
disorganized and "inattentive" group. The potential losers, on the 
contrary, are attentive and warlike. So, if the policy preference of the 
decision-maker is not extraordinarily strong, such policies will be (ceteris 
paribus) rare and, even in those cases when they are discussed, will tend 
to be postponed, delegated, transformed, or framed as "symbolic" policies 
(that is mere declarations of intention without any actual alteration of the 
distribution of the payoffs). I will call these policies regulatory-specific.
d) Policies with diffused benefits and diffused costs. Here neither 
the "winners" nor the "losers" are organized. It may also be that the loser 
and the winner is the same person (for instance a taxpayer who at the 
same time is also the recipient of an health program). In principle, such 
policies should be adopted fairly easily, because of the lack of strong 
opposition. But the decision-maker's motivation could be lacking in turn. 
As they are not very attentive, the beneficiaries will tend to ignore, or 
"forget", that the benefit has been allocated by that decision- maker, or 
that a benefit has been allocated at all. Therefore, despite the wide 
number of electors affected, the individual representative will not expect 
to gain huge amounts of votes from such policies. The situation becomes 
more favourable if these belong to party program, or the government's, 
or that of some ministries. I will call such policies general. If the agenda 
is crowded, general policies can be postponed, because the decision­
makers will prefer not to engage in an effort which is electorally
7 Such purely divisive policies can be kept logically distinct from ideologically divisive 
policies, which are discussed in the next paragraph. This means that the conflicting 
interests of the two groups (that is those who bear the concentrated costs and those who 
hope to gain the concentrated benefits) are actually defined in purely "material" terms. 
Think, for instance, of a conflict between retail dealers and wholesale dealers over a new 
law regulating contractual conditions. It must be noticed, however, that in principle every 
governmental measure could be defined or redifined in ideological terms, by recourse to 
some conception of the public good, and that in practice this is very likely to happen in 
European polities, where ideological parties are present. Divisive policies, therefore, will 




























































































unrewarding, and instead promote policies with more tangible gains. 
More than other kinds of policy, therefore, the probable adoption of 
general policies is heavily dependent on the features of the governmental 
system. If these stress the importance of general programs and allow their 
implementation, general policies will be frequent. Otherwise, their 
adoption will become more haphazard.
Addenda: Ideology; Substantive Difficulty
It is not always true that diffused costs or benefits correspond to an 
"inattentive public". Sometimes a disorganized group is mobilized by a 
"political entrepreneur", becoming a movement "for" or "against" 
something. One obvious example quoted by Wilson is Ralph Nader. In 
such cases one type of policy process is transformed into another. For 
instance, a policy that begins, or could have begun, as regulatory-specific, 
can become divisive if the vast group of people who get the benefits acts 
in an organized way (with pressure, protests, lobbying, etc.).
An even more complex situation (not considered by Wilson, who 
deals only with the US case) occurs when the feelings of the public are 
mobilized by the parties through an ideological appeal. "Ideology" is 
meant here, in a rather loose sense, as a world view organized around a 
set of identifying values (that can concern religions, ethnic or traditional 
bonds, class loyalties, political philosophies, etc.). In this case, too, some 
policy processes concerning diffused benefits or costs will be 
controversial, rather than smooth, if those benefits or costs are 
ideologically defined and evoke, therefore, collective identification. So, 
for instance, a policy that, according to the mere number of the people it 
benefits and damages, seems to be regulatory-specific or general, could be 
the result of powerful clashes between ideological stands, and therefore 
must be labelled divisive, as in the above-mentioned case of the 
disarticulated group mobilized by an entrepreneur. The role of the 
entrepreneur, here, is played by the party and its ideology.
There is, however, an important difference. In "idealtypical" 
divisive policies we have a conflict between some groups, while the 
political decision makers are pressured and counterpressured by them. In 
ideologically divisive policies, instead, the decision maker himself, acting 
as a representative of a party and its ideological stand, is supposed to be 
the natural advocate of one of the two conflicting positions. This has 
relevant consequences for the policy's chances of success. "Pure" divisive 
policies, as we have seen, are always embarrassing decisions, to be 
avoided, postponed, delegated or trasformed whenever possible. 
Ideologically divisive policies, on the contrary, often reinforce the 
identification of party followers, and could therefore be preferred, even 
if they create some losers (who would never vote for that party anyway). 




























































































"majoritarian" democracies some ideologically divisive policies will have 
good chances of success. But if the majority supporting the government is 
composite or consociational (for this terminology see below), these "hot" 
issues will be systematically avoided, because they would undermine the 
stability of the coalition.
So far we have spoken about the political difficulty of a policy­
making decision. But there is also another kind of difficulty. A given 
policy could be politically uncontroversial, but very complicated if we 
look at its substantive content. Its political difficulty, therefore, must be 
kept distinct from iuts substantive difficulty.
Very roughly, we could say that this second kind of difficulty is a 
function of the seriousness of the problem addressed by the policy under 
consideration. We have a difficult problem when it is possible to choose 
between many alternative solutions, when these solutions are complex 
(because they need time, expert judgment, ad hoc and detached 
knowledge, comparisons, periods of experimentation, cumbersome 
apparatuses of enforcement, lengthy and sophisticated legal provisions, 
and so on), and/or when the damage (both in the form of unnecessary 
costs inflicted or of great benefits unnecessarily squandered) that the 
policy could provoke in case of a mistake (incorrect definition of the 
problem, choice of the wrong means, perverse side effects, etc.) is very 
large.
Again very roughly and tentatively (because some concrete 
instances could belie the following correlation), we could choose to rank 
the above said types of policy, according to their degree of substantive 
difficulty, in the following way: general, regulatory-specific, divisive, 
distributive, where the general ones are usually the more difficult 
substantively (given the amount of damage that they could produce, and 
given the frequent complexity of their machinery), and an individual 
distributive policy is usually the easiest, at least from the point of view of 
the politician (but many distributive policies pose, of course, serious 
substantive problems, for instance of a budgetary kind).
When substantively difficult policies are politically difficult as well 
(for example, in those cases when they are intended by the actors to be 
ideologically divisive) it is reasonable to suppose that the chance of an 
appropriate substantive solution being reached is seriously reduced. The 
policy will often be delayed, transformed, distorted during the process of 
its adoption, or framed from the very beginning in a substantively 




























































































Some Advantages o f the Policy-Types Approach
As we have seen before, each type of policy takes into account, at 
the same time, the distinctive logic of a type of policy-making process in 
"pure" conditions. By adding other conditions to the pure situation we 
should be able, furthermore, to predict/explain systematically possible 
alterations to the pure process.
Wilson’ s typology, compared to other current typologies, is more 
elegant and exhaustive. It may be said to allow a form al analysis of 
decision-making processes (those which take place in cabinets, in our 
case), because they are examined in accordance with certain properties 
they possess, irrespective o f the content of the policy under discussion. 
Formality in the sense in which I use it here, however, is less 
parsimonious than the axiomatic approach followed by mathematically 
minded scholars allows, because it requires the introduction of numerous 
and different contextual conditions.
If we consider cabinet policy-making, we can now decompose it in 
conformity with types of policy pursued. This could enable us, among 
other things, to be slightly more precise about which decision-making 
mode or style (e. g. formal, consensual, bargaining, conflictual, 
authoritative) is likely to be adopted for a given policy; what degree of 
autonomy or dependence, with respect to parties or to social groups, the 
cabinet is likely to exhibit on a particular policy; more generally, how the 
type of policy at issue affects what happens inside the cabinet; and 
conversely, how the specific attributes of the cabinet affect the way a 
policy is treated.
The general idea is that the specific attributes of a given cabinet can 
be seen as obstacles or facilitations to the success of the policies sponsored 
by its ministers. In this sense, we might as well speak of decision-making 
through cabinet, rather than in cabinets. I do not dare to consider the 
question of whether cabinets decide at all. It is certainly one stage of the 
policy-making process, though not wholly decisive. But this can be said 
for any stage of the process. Cabinets decide little. Mostly they ratify 
decisions already taken elsewhere. But these decisions could have been 
specified in a peculiar manner - in accordance with the rule of anticipated 
reactions - because a given cabinet is structured and works in a certain 
way. Things being so, it makes sense to conclude that the cabinet stage 
deserves specific attention from students of the policy-process.
If the cabinet’s characteristics are to be seen as obstacles or 
facilitations with reference to the chance of success of the different kinds 
of policy, it is understandable that the fewer the obstacles the easier the 
adoption of all kinds of policy. To achieve cabinet support also increases 
the probability of the bill passing successfully through subsequent stages 
of the process. Conversely, the presence of obstacles renders the adoption 
of already controversial policies even more difficult, and consequently 




























































































will not probably take place inside the cabinet); or these obstacles will 
make the insurgence of conflicts within the cabinet more probable. 
Certain obstacles or facilitations will affect policies of a certain type, and 
not others, and so on. We then have to consider in more detail the 
cabinet's characteristics and their impact on the policy process. This will 
be done by distinguishing three sets: those concerning the way a cabinet 
works; those concerning the individual members; those concerning the 
majority supporting the cabinet.
How the Cabinet Works
The first set of features embraces those concerning the internal 
organization of the cabinet and its normal functioning.
Among these we can mention: i) the number and duration of the 
cabinet meeetings; ii) the norms about the debate taking place inside them 
(length of speeches, number of interventions allowed, requirement of a 
formal vote, decision rule in case of conflict, e.g. unanimity, simple 
majority, etc.); iii) the issues normally debated (always broad policy 
guidelines or conflict between departments, or also specific issues) and, 
conversely, those normally excluded from the debate; iv) the style of the 
debate (type of arguments used, kind of working atmosphere).
As regards point iii, it can be said that generally speaking cabinets 
are supposed to deliberate on the priorities and strategic lines of 
governmental action; to function as court of appeal for controversies at 
the level of intra-cabinet committees, or between ministers; to review 
selectively some of the policies at issue; to react to the most salient issues 
emerging from day-to-day politics; to manage the conflicts arising inside 
the cabinet itself; to go through routine decisions, that is decisions which 
are formally approved, but not really debated by them.
As regards point iv, the style partly depends on written or 
unwritten rules about how yo conduct the debate, and partly on the 
personality of the leader and the ministers, but it has also something to do 
with the overall political culture. This could require, for instance, the use 
of arguments of a technical-pragmatic type, or, conversely, ones 
impregnated with ideological and emotional overtones 8.
If the above-mentioned features are taken as constant and the policy 
output as variable, we can say that the more cabinet meetings are
8 On the subject of decision-making styles, or athmospheres, see H. Eulau, Decisional 
Structures in Small Legislative Bodies, in S.C. Patterson and J.C. Wahlke (eds.), 
Comparative Legislative Behavior, New York, Wiley, 1972, pp. 107-139; see also F. 
Miiller-Rommel, The Centre o f Government in West Germany: Changing Pattrens under 




























































































restricted in number and duration, the debate is limited, the issues debated 
are general, the style is pragmatic and negotiations take place, the less all 
kinds of policy are obstructed.
The more cabinet meetings are numerous and lengthy, the debate is 
free, the issues debated are specific, the style is advocatory/ideological 
and negotiations are excluded, the more difficulties, ceteris paribus, will 
be met by divisive or regulatory-specific policies and (depending on the 
type of majority) by ideologically divisive policies, which will tend to be 
altered during the process.
Another feature that deserves mention, and that differs strongly 
from country to country, is given by the legal rules on how to apportion 
issues between new legislation, on the one hand, and administrative 
measures, on the other; on which measures are the exclusive competence 
of ministers; and on which need to be ratified, at least formally, by the 
cabinet. Two extreme situations can be imagined:
1) Many kinds of measure reserved to administrative-ministerial 
competence; no control by the cabinet, not even a formal one. In these 
cases, obviously, the cabinet does not decide at all, and consequently does 
not act either as an obstacle or as an aid to the policies at issue.
2) General legislative competence; the need for the cabinet to act as 
a filter, at least in formal terms, for bills sponsored by the government 
and by individual ministers. In such conditions the cabinet's role can 
become important, both as a check (in principle on all kinds of policy) 
and as an aid (for those policies that eventually gain its support).
A third organizational feature is the workload 9 carried by the 
cabinet, which partly depends on the rules on competences. Let us 
imagine three situations:
1) If the workload is not huge, an effective review by the cabinet of 
some salient policies becomes possible; this amounts to an obstacle for 
these policies.
2) If its amount is vast, and the control exerted is normally only 
formal and routine, then on the whole any kind of policy is less likely to 
be reviewed;
3) if its amount is vast, but there is some control, if not by the 
cabinet itself, at least by the prime minister's staff, then all types af policy 
are delayed, especially the substantively difficult ones, that require more 
time to be examined; it is then necessary, for the policy to acquire a 
favourable position on the agenda, to be or to become salient, hence more 
visible and maybe ideologically controversial.
9 On the topic of a legislature's workload see W.M. Crain, Cost and Output in the 
Legislative Firm, "Journal of Legal Studies”, VIII, 1979, pp. 607-621; R.D. Hedlund 
and P.K. Freeman, A Strategy for Measuring the Performance o f Legislatures in 
Processing Decisions, "Legislative Studies Quarterly", 1, 1981, pp. 87-113; and La 




























































































The last organizational feature to be mentioned is that of intra­
cabinet committees 10. If the workload is heavy, and if the deliberations 
of such committees are ratified by the cabinet without further discussion, 
in principle committees allow for a deeper examination of the policies 
with intersectoral aspects submitted to them, thereby delaying their 
adoption; but if a bargaining decision-making style is followed, then on 
average the passing of all kinds of proposals will be eased. More 
frequently, however, committees exert a substantial check on policy 
proposals; so, given the rules of competence that prescribe what kind of 
policy must pass through a committee, some policies could be obstructed, 
while some others could be eased; if the workload is heavy, 
uncontroversial but complex general policies can be treated more 
adequately and quickly by a committee; ideologically divisive, regulatory- 
specific or divisive policies will find more obstacles; even distributive 
policies could run into difficulties, because of the need for coherence and 
coordination stressed in committees.
As the example of interministerial committees shows, not every 
"obstacle" worsens the substantive quality of a policy under discussion. 
An obstacle can often delay or block the process, forcing a compromise 
that will disfigure the original solution, but in other cases it could also 
impose a more careful deliberation. It is doubtful, however, that, with the 
exception of what is done in these committees, the cabinet is the proper 
place in which to submit policies (especially the most complex ones) to a 
detailed and extensive review.
The Members o f the Cabinet
If ministers are specialists (also in the sense of having enjoyed a 
long tenure in the same department), they will tend to avoid interfering in 
other ministers' businesses, save in cases of intersectoral policy 10 1. They
10 See T. Mackie and B. Hogwood (eds.), Unlocking the Cabinet, London, Sage, 1985, 
and the works quoted at footnote 2. For the British case see also I. Jennings, Cabinet 
Government, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959, pp. 250 ff.; C. Seymour-Ure, The 
Disintegration o f the Cabinet and the Neglected Issue o f Cabinet Reform, "Parliamentary 
Affairs", XXIV, 1971, pp. 196-207; J.P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet, London, 
Stevens, 1977, pp. 520 ff. See also P. Waleffe, Some Constitutional Aspects o f Recent 
Cabinet Development in Great Britain and in Belgium. Prime Minister's Position and 
Cabinet Committees, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1968. On the so-called "inner cabinet" see, 
further to the aforesaid works, and with reference to the Italian case, G. Pitruzzella, II 
consiglio di gabinetto nel governo italiano, "Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico”, 3, 
1985, pp. 639-677.
11 The differences between "specialists" and "amateurs" is treated in Blondel, 




























































































will also tend to favour policies serving the interests of the groups closest 
to the department, hence policies which contain concentrated benefits, 
even if shaped as general. Some departments have competence in matters 
where only concentrated benefits are allocated; others have a 
responsibility for policies of a more comprehensive kind. Ministers can 
sometimes be willing to allocate concentrated costs, especially if these fall 
on groups which are not among the clients of the department (but in this 
case they can expect the opposition from other ministers, whose clients 
stand to be the potential losers). Otherwise, they will normally tend to 
avoid such choices, or to compensate the losers by transforming the 
concentrated costs into diffused ones. This transformation, however, takes 
place in pre-cabinet stages, in "iron triangles" or "policy communities".
Ministers with a short tenure will tend not to interfere with policies 
perceived as belonging to other departments.
Well staffed ministers will be more effective in pursuing their 
policies, even in case of opposition by other ministers, and will also be 
more effective in understanding which policies put forward by others 
could damage their interests.
Ministers with a party-political origin, who carry a certain weight 
in their party or faction, and have occupied different posts during their 
ministerial career, will be more inclined to interfere with other ministers' 
proposals; this will create difficulties for ideologically divisive, 
regulatory-specific and divisive policies, which could be opposed also by 
ministers belonging to the same party as their proponent.
The role of the premier must also be considered. Normally he is 
not interested in specific policies, with the exception of broad questions of 
economic and foreign policy and issues rendered urgent by contingent 
events. Nevertheless, if he can use (formally or informally) effective 
powers in steering and closing the debate, and he is well staffed, he can, 
to a certain extent, allow the expression of certain conflicts inside the 
cabinet, which will eventually be overcome thanks to the authority of the 
prime minister; in this case, policies not consistent with the government 
program, or with the prime minister's preferences, will be ruled out, be 
they controversial or not; some controversial policies (pure divisive, 
regulatory specific or ideologically divisive, which in this case are 
controversial in society, but normally not inside the cabinet) will be 
supported.
If the prime minister has few steering powers and his position is 
weak, all controversial policies (divisive, regulatory specific, 
ideologically divisive) will be avoided, unless exceptional circumstances 
force the government to deal with them 12.
12 See R. Rose and E.N. Suleiman (eds.), Presidents and Prime Ministers, AEI, 
Washington D.C., 1981. For a typical case of a weak Prime Minister see S. Cassese, Is 
there a Government in Italy? Politics and Administration at the Top, in Rose-Suleiman; E. 
Spagna Musso (ed.), Costituzione e struttura del Governo. Vol. I: Il problema della 




























































































Types of Supporting Majority
The type of majority supporting the goverment is probably the 
most relevant variable to be considered. It affects in a powerful and 
systematic way both the decision-making process inside the cabinet itself 
(as well as some of the two sets of features discussed above) and the 
chances of success of the different types of policy in the subsequent 
parliamentary discussion. Here we will consider only the first aspect.
I will distinguish three types of majority
1) compact: one party or more then one party, usually ideologically 
adjacent, and in a durable partnership; if the compact majority is 
coalitional, its durability could sometimes depend on the ideological 
position of the partners, which forces the choice of a given majority, or 
could also be the result of appropriate rules (e.g. the German 
"constructive" no-confidence vote);
2) composite: at least two, but normally more than two parties, 
ideologically more heterogeneous, in a very unstable partnership; the size 
of the supporting majority is small; durability-inducing rules are absent 
or ineffective;
3) consociational: very large majority, with strong ideological distances 
between members, in a rather unstable partnership.
1) Ceteris paribus, compact majorities are likely to favour:
- many general policies;
- some divisive policies, pure and ideological (both if consistent with the 
government platform and/or with the premier's policy preferences);
- some regulatory-specific policies;
- many distributive policies (but not so many if the financial check is 
effective and the allocation of the diffused costs implied is not consistent 
with the government platform).
With compact majorities the government platform is likely to be 
detailed, legitimized by direct electoral support, influential. Some groups 
in society (those whose support is cmcial for the reelection) will be very 
influential in cabinet decisions. The stand taken by the majority party, or 
parties, will influence cabinet’s decisions on visible and ideologically 
salient issues. Sometimes, however, also the reverse could happen: since
e 1' organizzazione del governo, Padova, Cedam, 1986; Id., L ' organizzazione 
amministrativa della presidenza del consiglio, "Foro italiano", 6,1989, pp. 371-384.
13 a  more diffused discussion of the types of majority is in La Spina, La decisione 
legislativa, pp. 338 ff. See also G. Loewenberg and S.C. Patterson, Comparing 
Legislatures, Boston, Little-Brown, 1979, pp. 213 ss. The term "consociational" is of 
course drawn from the works of A. Lijphart, such as Consociational Democracy, "World 
Politics”, XXI, 1968-69, pp. 207-225; Democracies: Patterns o f Majoritarian and 





























































































the ministers are also party leaders, they can in turn shape party attitudes. 
On the whole, cabinet decision-making is relatively autonomous and the 
cabinet tends to be seen more as a working than as a discussing body (but 
this depends also on the specific attributes of the ministers and of their 
organization).
2) Composite majorities, again ceteris paribus, favour:
- some general policies (only if they get on the agenda and are not 
controversial; if ideological distances between the partners are present, 
such policies could meet more difficulties);
- very few divisive policies, pure and ideological (often transformed 
through diffusion of the costs);
- a minimum of regulatory-specific policies (possible only if the losers 
belong to sectors of society not represented among the parties of the 
coalition, or through sleights of hand; usually, they will be transformed 
into mixed or symbolic policies)
- many distributive policies.
The government program is likely to be vague, not supported by 
direct electoral assent, not very influential, and will be neglected if 
necessary. Many groups will be influential, but they will normally 
succeed only in blocking undesired policies. Having desired policies 
approved is much more difficult, if they imply concentrated or 
ideologically defined costs; not so for distributive policies. The parties are 
very influential, but again more in blocking policies than in pushing them; 
so, many decisions are party or group dependent. The autonomy of the 
premier and that of the cabinet lies only in the management of conflict 
they operate, and, even more, in setting the agenda so as to avoid in a 
systematic way controversial issues that would destroy the coalition. The 
cabinet tends to be also a discussing body.
3) Consociational majorities, ceteris paribus, favour:
- many general policies (provided that these stress only unifying values, 
presenting themselves as ideological omnibus, and have a strong symbolic 
impact; ideologically divisive policies, or policies framed in a divisive 
way, must be excluded);
- few divisive policies;
- few regulatory-specific policies (both pure divisive and regulatory- 
specific policies will be approved only if they are essential points of the 
government program; if possible, they will be transformed into mixed or 
symbolic policies);
- many distributive policies.
The government program will be extensive, will include some 
"major reforms", will be rich in declarations of principle and intent, but 
more vague in terms of policy choices. It is not directly legitimized by 
electoral support, and influential only to a certain extent. Many social 
groups will be influential in blocking the allocation of concentrated costs 
or in pushing for concentrated benefits, if these do not imply concentrated 




























































































very influential, even in agenda setting. If the parties are interested in the 
survival of the consociational coalition, they will normally try to obtain 
trade-offs benefiting all the members of the coalition, but it will not be 
possible to push too many controversial policies too hard; rather, they 
will try to reshape potentially conflictual proposals, both in parliamentary 
discussion and, to a lesser extent, in cabinet work. The cabinet will 
sometimes be seen also as a debating body.
The following pictures sum up the impact of the kind of majority 


































































































































































































































The "predictions" derived so far from the correlation between 
types of policy and cabinet’s features are of course only hypotheses which 
need to be tested and refined by careful analysis of the policy outputs of 
existing cabinets. Let us suppose, for a moment, that such an analysis does 
not disprove those hypotheses. If we consider what appears to be the most 
relevant variable, the supporting majority (whose impact could be 
modified in part by some of the other variables), we see that the 
performances of the three types of majority should differ greatly.
Composite majorities fare well only on distributive policies, that is 
those policies that an external observer would probably consider the most 
trivial, from the point of view of their substantive difficulty, and the least 
relevant socially. Consociational majorities fare better than composite 
ones on general policies (but not on regulatory-specific and divisive 
ones). It must be remembered, however, that now the guidelines of such 
policies will have to be agreed upon by a number of parties, whose 
ideological stands could collide at various points. The decision-makers, 
therefore, will stress unifying and vague principles, avoiding disturbing 
ends and means. This could seriously diminish the substantive accuracy of 
the general policies passed thanks to a consociational majority.
Compact majorities appear to be the best suited to obtain policies 
which are both substantively and politically difficult. They are not, per se, 
suited to avoiding an abundance of distributive policies, but this result 
could be reached by means of procedural and financial constraints. It 
should not be forgotten, however, that the majority now has a free hand 
to "impose" its ideological definitions of the policies at issue. The risk of 
a "tyranny" exerted by the representatives of the majority is more present 
than in composite majorities (consociational majorities indeed imply the 
same risk, although to a different degree). Yet, this evil could also be 
avoided, for example by introducing a detailed and rigid constitution and 
a constitutional court, which would restrain the policy-makers' freedom 
of manouvre in certain areas. These, however, are problems to be treated 
first by political philosophers, and then by constitutional engineers. Even 
if the expectation of different policy outputs from different cabinet 
characteristics in accordance with the model sketched here was 
corroborated by empirical evidence, it would not follow immediately 
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